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Abstract
When a company is hacked, market participants take notice. This has been observed consistently for at least a decade, mostly through
calculating abnormal returns of individual corporate stocks after a company’s information security incident announcement. Some
researchers have found that information security incidents have had a decreasing effect on stock price over time. Their reports suggest
that breach related stock price impacts have become increasingly shallow and short-lived. This has led some information security
economists to suggest that market forces are not enough to incentivize sufficient corporate investment to information security. They
argue that further regulation is necessary to remedy what seems like a rise in investor apathy toward corporate breaches. Other
researchers, though, have cautioned that further examination is required and that other market metrics—beyond individual stock price
movements—are available to better understand the effects of an information security incident.
Sector-wide systematic risk is a measure of the sector’s exposure to exogenous shock. Here, this risk measurement is applied to
measure the spillover effects of a corporate information security incident. I conduct 203 event studies between the years 2006 and
2016, calculating sector-wide systematic risk within American stock markets, to measure the spillover effects of data breaches within
finance, healthcare, technology and services sectors. The novel application of a longitudinal analysis of variance between repeated
event studies reveals that the sector-wide spillover of an incident is both significant and growing. This suggests that an increasingly
compelling market incentive exists for sectors to police themselves. Also, further inquiry into common factors among outliers to these
sector-wide trends may reveal best-practice strategies for information security risk management.
Keywords: Information Security Economics, Event Study, Longitudinal Analysis, Systematic Risk
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Introduction

Increasing rates of data breaches, despite ongoing information security
investments, motivate continued research in information security
economics (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyschyn, & Zhou, 2015). Attacks span
industries (consumer electronics, retail, etc.) and market categories
(government, public, private, not-for-profit) (Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck, &
Trillig, 2015). To better inform information security investment, there
have been several analytic attempts to quantify and understand the effects
of information security incidents.
Anderson (2001) provided seminal research investigating the difficulties
of quantifying the inputs to information security investment decisions
through the lens of economics. Estimating changes to the marketgenerated risk premium, represented by the beta coefficient in modern
portfolio theory’s capital asset pricing model, as shown in Equation 1,
where  represents the intercept of the regression,  represents the slope

of the regression measuring systematic risk, Rm represents the expected
market return, Rf represents the risk-free rate, and  represents the random
error accounting for unsystematic risk (Cardenas, Coronado, Donald,
Parra & Mahmood, 2012).

Expected Return = a + b (Rm -R f ) + e

(1)

This model is a necessary component of a manager’s decision calculus
regarding capital allocations (Anderson, 2001). Managers of publicly
traded firms seek to positively impact share prices and are thereby
influenced by changes to the risk premiums applied within capital
markets. Anderson’s 2001 investigation of difficulties with quantifying
the inputs to information security investment decisions remains
unresolved. For example, Hinz et al. (2015) conclude that the effects of
information security incidents on risk premium are poorly understood,
which creates uncertainty for the methods used to determine a firm’s
capital costs through risk premium.
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Information security economists continue to investigate optimal
investment expenditures and hypothesize on the mechanisms available to
motivate further expenditure (Gordon et al., 2015). In 2015, Gordon et al.
built on previous work to extend the Gordon-Loeb Model (Gordon &
Loeb, 2002) to evaluate the optimal information security investment as a
function of risk management function. The authors considered the
monetary loss, vulnerability, and probability to determine the expected
loss after an investment in security. The extended Gordon-Loeb Model,
shown in Equation 2, includes the calculation of losses arising from
externalities like those described by the within-industry spillover effect of
perceived risk, hypothesized by Etredge and Richardson (2003) and
confirmed by later research (Kashmiri, Nicol & Hsu, 2017). The extended
Gordon-Loeb Model presents an inequality, shown in Equation 2, that
calculates the maximum a risk-neutral firm should invest in information
security protections, taking into account both internal and external costs,
where zsc represents the socially optimal level of firm investment in
information security, v represents the underlying vulnerability as a
probability that a breach attempt will be successful without further
information security investment, LP represents expected private losses
resulting from an information security incident, LE represents expected
externality losses, and  = LE/LP represents the ratio between externality
losses and private losses when an information security incident occurs
(Gordon et al., 2015). This equation builds on previous findings that
establish the economically optimal maximum investment as 36.79% of
expected loss (Gordon & Loeb, 2002).

z sc (v) < (1/ e)(1+ g )vLP » 0.3679(1+ g )vLP

(2)

The concept of a within-industry spillover effect is an extension of
previous efforts to document information followership patterns in capital
markets (Anderson & Holt, 1997), and convergent behavior herding (Zhou
& Lai, 2009). This is further confirmed by recent investigation by Lee,
Hall and Cegielski (2018), who consider the theoretical characteristics
among companies that may create similarities and probably influence
contagion effects after an information security event.
According to Hinz et al. (2015), it was unclear how data breach effects on
capital market participants have changed over time. This was important
because, in 2011, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou concluded that information
security breaches may have a diminishing effect on a firm’s systematic
risk over time, implying that capital market participants see exposure to
data breaches as decreasingly important. In 2015, Gordon et al. used
Gordon, Loeb and Zhou’s 2011 findings to postulate the argument that
additional government regulation is necessary to create economically
optimal information security purchasing decisions. This was especially
relevant given the recent push for research on within-industry spillover
effects of the breach of an individual company (Kashmiri et al., 2017;
Martin, Borah, & Palmatier, 2017), and the 2015 argument by Gordon et
al. that these spillover effects represent social costs that require regulatory
mitigation.
However, Hinz et al. (2015) reviewed the available evidence and found
that further research is necessary to better characterize the changing
impact of a data breach on risk measurements in capital markets. This
impacts all companies seeking to finance through public investment
markets, and probably has greater impact when companies are
economically similar.
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Methods

This study quantitatively describes the changes over time of information
security incident spillover effects. This study analyzed the variance across
repeated measurements of event studies, each of which calculated sectorwide systematic risk using the capital asset pricing model, to inform the
ongoing debate between extrinsic vs. intrinsic market incentivization, as
well as the necessity of further information security investment within
those sectors most prone to data breaches.
Event studies allow the measurement of changes in financial data that can
be statistically attributable to a specific event. The event study method
relies on the calculation of the abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997), using
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) regression equation, shown in
Equation 1 and described above. The inputs to CAPM were publicly
available at Yahoo! Finance (2017), Google Finance (2017), and several
other public sites. The data for information security incidents were
available at PrivacyRights.org (PrivacyRights, 2017).

Table 1. Summary of Breaches Selected for Sample

Screening criterion

Number of breaches
available for study

Total breaches reported (2006-2016)
Even-year stratification
Traded on NYSE or NASDAQ
Most frequent sectors (87% of breaches)
Stock data available around breach dates

5325
2059
285
228
203

The 203 investigated breaches were spread across the Healthcare, Finance,
Technology and Services sectors.

Table 2. Indexes and Sectors

Sector

Index

Ticker

Financial
Healthcare
Services
Technology
Market Model

Vanguard Financials ETF
Vanguard Health Care ETF
VanEck Vectors Retail ETF
Vanguard Info. Tech. ETF
S&P 500

VFH
VHT
RTH
VGT
GSPC

Of all available indices, the Vanguard exchange traded funds (ETFs) are among the
longest running and most widely known. Each corresponds directly to the sector
under investigation, with the exception of the services sector. Due to Vanguard’s
within-sector split between consumer stables and consumer discretionary goods, the
VanEck Vectors Retail ETF was selected as an appropriate balance across the
industries making up that sector.

The population of firms suffering data breaches was difficult to quantify,
due to the active concealment employed by perpetrators employ to conceal
breaches. Among the global population of breaches, several types of data
compromise existed. These were categorized as fraud involving payment
card(s), detection of hacking or other malware, intentional insider breach,
physical loss of paper records, loss of portable device(s), loss of stationary
device(s), and unintended disclosure (PrivacyRights, 2017). In practice,
many initial reports did not contain a full understanding of the breach
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vector so the population also contained a category for unknown causes.
The number of information security incidents that were not publicly
disclosed remains a source of speculation beyond the purview of this
investigation.
Publicly traded firms represented only a fraction of the companies who
reported breaches during the time span under investigation. Of the
available breach records, only every other year of data were considered,
which allowed for discrete groupings of the continuous event study
regression outputs. Of the 2,059 breach reports occurring in the even years
between 2006 and 2016, 285 represented companies traded on the NYSE
or NASDAQ exchanges. A frequency analysis revealed that 87% of
publicly traded breaches occurred in four core sectors: Financial,
Healthcare, Services and Technology. As shown in Table 1, there were
enough available data to conduct 203 event studies. Calculation of
abnormal returns requires an expected market return, as shown and
described in Equation 1, which necessitates the selection of sector and
market indexes. These index and market model selection are depicted in
Table 2 and represent the best sector-industry fit among available
alternatives. The market model used here—the Standard & Poor’s 500
list—matches the model used in the systematic risk analysis performed by
Hinz et al. (2015). The standardization of market models allows for
comparison between findings, which is important when (as in Hinz et al.’s
report) there was no significance observed in change to the systematic risk
for an individual firm.

Fig. 1. Event studies of sector-wide systematic risk as a measurement of
spillover effect. The primary measurement instrument was used repeatedly across
the time-stratified sample to compare pre- and post-event mean covariance of sector
and market returns, relative to variance of market returns, over a 241-day event
window. An exclusion period of 21 days insulates against short-term share price
effects, disparate information dispersion, and other market inefficiencies.

The reliability of the event study relies on a rolling beta factor to examine
covariance of sector and market returns, and variance of market returns,
during an event window. As shown in Figure 1, the event window consists
of a 241-day period (-120, 0, +120). The main threat to reliability existed
with the potential conflation of short-term effects resulting from the
breach announcement on the firm or sector returns. This corresponded to
a potential for temporary skew in the intercept ( ), which could have
confounded the slope calculation () in the regression model. In
accordance with the recommendation and practice by Hinz et al. (2015),
this study excluded a period of 21 days (-10, 0, +10) around the breach

announcement, which partially controls for bias resulting from cumulative
abnormal returns associated with the breach itself (Hinz et al., 2015; Yayla
& Hu, 2011). Further, the exclusion period helps offset potential market
inefficiencies resulting in uneven information dispersion about the
information security incident itself. Finally, specific deviation from the
CAPM equation for the event study calculations in this study included
omission of Rf, and , which follows precedents set by Hinz et al. (2015)
and Schatz and Bashroush (2016), in accordance with the market model
method recommended by Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephan (1984), that
instead favors the derivative shown in Equation 3.

bi = cov(Ri , Rm ) / var(Rm )

(3)

Each event study is conducted using Equation 4, where post and pre each
represent the mean slope of 110 regressions, where each regression
examines 120 days of returns as described in Equation 3, when Ri
represents the return of the sector and Rm represents the market index
return.

Db = b post - b pre

(4)

To maintain the quality of data, each  was manually screened to only
consider those records that demonstrated statistically significant
differences between the pre- and post-breach regression means. All event
study records that failed to exceed a 95% confidence (p > .05) were
rejected, leaving 140 breach reports that showed significant differences
when comparing the sector’s risk profile before and after the breach.

Fig. 2. Information security incidents of publicly traded companies by year
and sector. In this repeated measures ANOVA, each sector is treated as a subject
and the event studies measuring sector-wide spillover from each breach provides the
means for within-subjects analysis of variance over time.

The measure of change to sector systematic risk over time () was
calculated to inform repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) and applied compound
symmetry for covariance structure determination. The use of REML
eliminates the effect of nuisance parameters, thereby allowing for
unbiased estimates of variance and covariance (Harville, 1977; Patterson
& Thompson, 1971). The model also employed a fixed intercept that set
2006 as a baseline control group against which each other year was
compared. The repeated measures ANOVA allows for examination of
the effects of multiple breaches within the same sector over time. The
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repeated measures ANOVA is most appropriate to test equality of means
under several different conditions involving repeated measures within the
same subject (Dien, 2017). As shown in Figure 2, I treat each sector as an
individual subject, where each event study is a measurement of that
sector’s risk-response to an information security incident.

3

Results

There was a significant relationship observed between year of a breach
(IV) and the change in sector systematic risk (DV), representing
information security incident spillover effect. The overall model fit is
significant at p = 0.015, with increasing significance over time, as
demonstrated in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.
As enumerated in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 4, significant results
existed only for the year of the breach (p = 0.036), not for firm sector (p =
0.344) or covariance effects between year and sector (p = 0.574).

Table 3. BY-YEAR spillover effects

Effects

Num df

Den df

F

p

BY YEAR

5

27

3.491

0.015

Source

 Value

Std Error

T

p

Intercept

0.000

2006

0.00%

2008

-0.04%

0.004

-0.093

0.926

2010

0.48%

0.003

1.402

0.172

2012

0.84%

0.004

2.268

0.032

2014

1.21%

0.004

3.183

0.004

2016

1.08%

0.004

2.672

0.013

Fig. 3. Significant changes to sector systematic risk over time reveal an increasing
information security spillover effect on sector as time increases.

The analysis of variance between the repeated measures within each sector revealed
a statistically significant overall effect on beta across all sectors—the sector-wide
systematic risk calculation used here to measure spillover effects from an
information security incident.

Table 4. BY-YEAR-BY-SECTOR spillover effects
Fig. 4. Spillover effects did not show significant differences between sectors.

Effects

Num df

Den df

F

p

YEAR

5

12

3.470

0.036

SECTOR

3

104

1.120

0.344

4

12

0.911

0.574

The findings presented here suggest that the potential exists for a marketbased incentive to motivate further information security investment. The
results demonstrate that breach effects can be measured across an entire
sector and that those sector-wide effects are increasing over time. This
study represents the first quantitative observation of those effects. These
data suggest that, after a firm is breached, the entire sector is perceived as
increasingly risky, which almost certainly raises the risk premium that
firms within the sector must pay when they seek financing.

YEAR*SECTOR 15

The covariance displayed in under by-year-by-sector breach effects on the mean
change in systematic risk, was nearly as likely to occur under the null hypothesis as
the alternative. This covariate analysis was revealed by a null model likelihood ratio
test ( = 0.024, p = 0.878).

Discussion and Future Research
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This study revealed three main areas of further investigation: 1)
examination of those event studies that did not reveal significant
differences in pre- and post- breach systematic risk within the sector; 2)
examination of those companies who were somehow immune to the
otherwise sector-wide spillover effects; and 3) regulatory regimes best
equipped to enforce compliance with market-driven standards for
information security risk management.
The 63 information security incidents that did not demonstrate
significance in the  calculation, shown in Equation 4, demonstrate
opportunity for future research. Specifically, further investigation should
consider the common factors among those events that suggest potential
organizational protections for spillover. Some theoretical considerations
are proposed by Lee, Hall and Cegielski (2018), who discuss the factors
that may influence contagion and therefore could suggest company- or
sector-specific spillover protections.
Similar suggestions might be harvested from individual investigation of
outliers within those event studies that demonstrated significant sectorwide spillover. An analysis of significant common factors among
outliers—those companies that are somehow shielded from spillover
effects—would suggest company-specific risk management policies and
practices that might insulate firms from the breach of a near neighbor.
My findings here, namely that market incentives do exist to motivate
sector-wide information security investment, present an evidentiary
challenge to the suggestion that further regulation is necessary to account
for the extrinsic costs of a breach. Taking these market incentives into
consideration, future research could consider regulatory regime options
that balance mandate and enforcement with sector- or industry-defined
standards. For example, Hemphill and Longstreet (2016) described a
model for meta-regulation that includes a compulsory mandate for
compliance with industry-defined information security standards. This is
in line with a body of research into standard setting initiatives within those
organizations most affected by the standard (eg. Romanosky, Hoffman, &
Acquisti, 2012; Aggarwal, Dai & Walden, 2011; and Khoo, Harris, &
Hartman, 2010). Also, the growing option for risk transfer through cyber
liability insurance and suggests that firms should consider this mechanism
for information security risk management. Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates
that there were no significant differences in spillover effects across
sectors, but it is interesting to observe the potential influence of the
financial sector on the overall analysis, as well as that sector’s changing
regulatory environment during the 2010-2012 time-span. While beyond
the scope of this investigation, a multicollinear analysis of regulatory
events and information security incidents within the financial industry
may demonstrate significance in follow-on inquiry.
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